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701 
A FEW GOOD ANGRY MEN:  APPLICATION 
OF THE JURY TRIAL CLAUSE OF THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO NON-CITIZENS 
DETAINED AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
THOMAS MCDONALD∗ 
Despite the substantial amount of writing on the Guantanamo Bay detention 
center, there has been very little discussion regarding which substantive 
constitutional rights are applicable to those being detained at the base.  The Jury 
Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment—as important as it is to the ultimate 
disposition of the detainees—has not been discussed in any detail at all.  
However, the history and jurisprudence surrounding the Jury Trial Clause 
suggests that it should apply in full in Guantanamo Bay. 
While there is some general debate as to which constitutional provisions apply 
extraterritorially, the fundamental nature of the right to jury trial indicates that 
it should apply in Guantanamo even if it is found to be an unincorporated 
territory.  Additionally, arguing, as the government has thus far, that the 
detainees are not entitled to a jury trial based on the rule created in Ex parte 
Quirin—that is, because they are enemy combatants charged with violating the 
law of war—may be applicable in some cases but would be inappropriate to 
extend as a categorical rule.  To that end, the government’s reliance on Quirin 
in Guantanamo is somewhat telling, as this argument actually presupposes that 
detainees would be entitled to the right to jury trial if Quirin were found not to 
apply.  Therefore, the government cannot lawfully conduct trials in Guantanamo 
Bay without adhering to the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
                                                 
 ∗ Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 62; J.D. 
Candidate May 2014, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A. 
Communication Studies, 2011, Clemson University.  Special thanks to Professor 
Stephen Vladeck for providing the advice and feedback that made this Comment 
possible.  I’d also like to thank my editor Pasha Sternberg and the rest of the Law 
Review staff for their hard work, meticulous edits, and helpful suggestions every step 
of the way.  Finally, to my family and friends for their support and patience 
throughout this process—I cannot express my appreciation enough.  Any remaining 
errors are mine alone. 
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“I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by 
which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of 
discussion concerning the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. 
                                                 
 1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 269 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
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Constitution.2  In particular, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Boumediene v. Bush3 raised the interesting and controversial question 
of which constitutional rights should apply at the Guantanamo Bay 
detention center.4  One provision that has received surprisingly little 
attention in this regard is the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment.5  By guaranteeing the right to an impartial jury for the 
accused in all criminal proceedings, the Jury Trial Clause adds an 
element of underlying fairness to the American criminal justice 
system.6  However, while the right to jury trial has come to be a highly 
valued component of the American legal system,7 questions 
concerning who can claim the title of “the accused” for Sixth 
Amendment purposes have not yet been fully settled. 
Relevant case law has clarified some areas of this debate more than 
others.  For example, with the exception of members of the U.S. 
military,8 it is generally true that American citizens against whom 
criminal proceedings are brought are entitled to a jury trial 
regardless of the geographic location9 of the trial itself.10  However, it 
                                                 
 2. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene 
v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 273 (2009) (observing that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Boumediene v. Bush failed to provide a bright-line rule regarding the 
geographical scope of constitutional rights). 
 3. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 4. See id. at 771 (extending the Suspension Clause to non-citizens held in 
Guantanamo Bay detention center); Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory:  
Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2108 (2009) 
(noting that one of the questions raised by Boumediene concerns whether 
Constitutional provisions other than the Suspension Clause “ha[ve] full effect” in 
Guantanamo (alteration in original)). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to . . . an impartial jury . . . .”).  Although a separate issue might arise 
concerning the requirements of Article III’s Jury Trial Clause, the Supreme Court 
has consistently read that provision in pari materia with the Sixth Amendment’s right 
to jury trial.  See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (describing the defendants’ 
right to jury trial as being conferred by Article III and the Sixth Amendment 
concurrently).  Thus, this Comment’s analysis focuses specifically on the Sixth 
Amendment question discussed herein. 
 6. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968) (asserting that juries 
are particularly important in criminal trials, where they make “judicial or 
prosecutorial unfairness less likely”). 
 7. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (referring to the right to jury trial as “the spinal column 
of American democracy”). 
 8. See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text (detailing the exception to the 
Jury Trial Clause, based on Congress’s Article I plenary power over the armed forces, 
for members of the U.S. military who are servicemembers at the time charges are 
brought). 
 9. This idea is part of the broader argument that the Constitution should 
“follow the flag”—that is, that certain constitutional provisions should apply in 
response to government action, regardless of where that action is taken.  See Frederic 
R. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 
823, 823 (1926) (noting the heated debate in the early 20th century over whether 
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is much less clear how the Clause relates to non-citizens in similar 
situations.  The Supreme Court partially answered this question in Ex 
parte Quirin11 by stating that the right to jury trial does not apply to 
non-citizens designated as enemy combatants that are charged with 
violating the laws of war.12  In creating this exception to the Jury Trial 
Clause,13 the Court focused heavily on the defendants’ status as 
enemy combatants and the nature of their alleged offenses, but said 
nothing about whether the defendants would otherwise have been 
entitled to a jury trial.14 
In the context of Guantanamo Bay, the question of whether 
detainees are entitled to the right to jury trial has been discussed 
strictly through the lens of Quirin’s law of war exception.15  For 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit recently considered two cases concerning whether it is 
appropriate to try Guantanamo detainees under Quirin for offenses 
such as conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism.16  
                                                 
the Constitution “follows the flag”); see also John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad:  
Principles for the Application of Constitutional Limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 287, 298–99 (1985) (opining that the Framers intended the Bill of 
Rights as a whole to apply to government action regardless of geographical 
constraints). 
 10. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1957) (plurality opinion) 
(extending the Jury Trial Clause to civilian dependents of U.S. servicemembers living 
on an overseas military base).  There is some recent debate as to whether 
independent contractors—regardless of citizenship—who are working with the U.S. 
military overseas are entitled to trial by jury in criminal cases during wartime.  See 
United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 271 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (Baker, C.J., concurring in part 
and in the result) (suggesting that those accompanying the U.S. military during 
combat operations should not be entitled to constitutional rights beyond what is 
afforded to the service members themselves).  But see Steve Vladeck, Analysis of U.S. v. 
Ali:  A Flawed Majority, Conflicting Concurrences, and the Future of Military Jurisdiction, 
LAWFARE (July 19, 2012, 8:09 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com 
/2012/07/analysis-of-caaf-decision-in-ali (noting the lack of precedent supporting 
the decision to treat independent contractors as U.S. servicemembers for purposes of 
constitutional analysis). 
 11. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 12. Id. at 41, 44. 
 13. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (describing Quirin’s limitation 
on the Jury Trial Clause based on the citizenship of the offender and the nature of 
the alleged offense). 
 14. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19. 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1166–67 (C.M.C.R. 
2011) (en banc) (applying the test set out in Quirin in the prosecution of a 
Guantanamo detainee charged with conspiracy and providing material support for 
terrorism), vacated, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013). 
 16. See Hamdan v. United States, 969 F.3d 1238, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(holding that providing material support for terrorism is not a violation of the Law of 
Nations and is therefore not subject to Quirin’s law of war exception); see also Al 
Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (vacating the 
defendant’s conviction in the Court of Military Commission Review on the ground 
that the crimes with which the defendant had been charged were not triable by 
military commission per the court’s decision in Hamdan). 
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Both of these cases, however, gloss over a more basic, but equally 
fundamental, question:  Outside the bounds of the Quirin exception, 
are Guantanamo detainees entitled to invoke the protections of the 
Jury Trial Clause at all, or are they a group to whom the right to jury 
trial categorically does not apply?  Despite the D.C. Circuit’s failure to 
issue a definitive ruling on this question in either case,17 the answer 
could have profound implications—both for the meaning of the Jury 
Trial Clause itself and for the rest of the Sixth Amendment in 
Guantanamo Bay. 
This Comment will argue that the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment applies to non-citizens detained in Guantanamo Bay 
because the Supreme Court has held that the Clause is fundamental 
to the American scheme of justice for individuals against whom the 
government has affirmatively commenced criminal proceedings.  The 
protection offered by the Clause is no less fundamental to 
Guantanamo detainees, and the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
categorically deny the right to jury trial to similarly situated 
individuals in Quirin signifies the Court’s belief that such a sweeping 
departure from the Sixth Amendment would be inappropriate. 
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief overview of the history 
and Supreme Court jurisprudence on the right to jury trial, the 
extraterritorial constitution, and the legal status of Guantanamo Bay.  
Part II will argue that the history and jurisprudence surrounding the 
Jury Trial Clause indicate that it should extend to Guantanamo 
detainees.  In doing so, Part II will discuss the fundamental nature of 
the right to jury trial and attempt to clarify the somewhat 
disorganized precedent left behind by the Insular Cases.18  Part II will 
                                                 
 17. The military courts in Al Bahlul and Hamdan ruled that the defendants were 
not entitled to a jury trial under Quirin, without mentioning the possible argument 
that Guantanamo detainees simply were not entitled to invoke the Jury Trial Clause.  
See Brief of the National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
the Petitioner at 22–24, Al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 
2013), 2012 WL 894499, at *22–24 [hereinafter Al Bahlul, Amicus Brief] (observing 
that the government has yet to argue that the right to jury trial categorically does not 
apply in Guantanamo Bay).  Given this framing, the D.C. Circuit ruled specifically on 
whether the Quirin exception applies in these cases rather than speaking more 
broadly to the categorical applicability of the Jury Trial Clause.  See Hamdan, 696 F.3d 
at 1252–53. 
 18. The Insular Cases are a line of cases decided by the Supreme Court between 
1901 and 1922 which dealt with the application of various constitutional provisions in 
newly acquired U.S. territories.  See Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of 
American Colonialism:  The Insular Cases (1901–1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 240–41 
(1996) (describing the Insular Cases line as including twenty-two cases arising in 
Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Alaska, and the Philippine Islands).  Four of the twenty-two 
cases typically discussed in the Insular Cases line deal with the right to jury trial.  See 
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922) (denying access to a jury for a Puerto 
Rican citizen facing misdemeanor libel charges); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 
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also contend that an argument against applying the Jury Trial Clause 
based on Quirin—while possibly applicable in some specific 
circumstances—is inappropriate to extend as a categorical rule.  
Additionally, Part II will argue that precedent surrounding the Jury 
Trial Clause, as well as the role of the jury in preserving the 
underlying fairness of American criminal proceedings, indicates that 
the Jury Trial Clause should extend to Guantanamo detainees.  
Finally, this Comment will conclude that, although the Jury Trial 
Clause may not categorically apply to all Guantanamo detainees, trial 
by jury should serve as the norm in Guantanamo Bay—at least until 
an exception to the Clause is found to apply. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. An Overview of the Right to Jury Trial 
The Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . an 
impartial jury.”19  Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 83 that 
the right to jury trial was one of the few points of agreement between 
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists at the Constitutional 
Convention.20  Even before the Founders met at the Convention, the 
right to jury trial in criminal cases was present in every state 
constitution in effect at the time.21  The importance of the Jury Trial 
Clause was hardly a novel concept to the Framers; the right to jury 
played a pivotal role in the English legal system as well.22  Indeed, the 
Framers’ unanimous respect for the jury trial as an institution—as 
                                                 
149 (1904) (holding that the Jury Trial Clause does not apply in the Philippines); 
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 214–16 (1903) (refusing to replace existing 
Hawaiian criminal procedural rules with an Anglo-American jury); Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901) (holding that some constitutional rights, including 
trial by jury, do not automatically attach in newly acquired territories). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 562 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Ernest 
Cooke ed., 1961) (observing that if the two competing groups agreed on nothing 
else, they “concur[red] at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury”).  
Hamilton further commented that “if there is any difference between [the 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists], it consists in this; the former regard it as a valuable 
safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.”  
Id. 
 21. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury 
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870 (1994) (noting that the right to jury 
trial for criminal defendants was the only right unanimously conferred by every 
state’s constitution). 
 22. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379 (“[T]he trial by jury ever has 
been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law.”); see also 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (observing that English use of trial by 
jury in criminal cases can be traced back as far as the Magna Carta in 1215). 
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well as their desire to preserve the right to jury in the American legal 
system23—is apparent through even the most cursory reading of the 
Constitution.24 
The Court first expressed its opinion on the importance of trial by 
jury in Ex parte Milligan.25  Declaring that “[n]o graver question was 
ever considered by this court,”26 Justice Davis concluded that the right 
to jury trial could not constitutionally be withheld from a member of 
the Confederate Army charged with several offenses against the 
Union in Indiana.27  This decision was by no means intended to be 
construed narrowly; rather, the Court went on to conclude in 
sweeping and absolute fashion: 
[I]f ideas can be expressed in words, and language has any 
meaning, this right—one of the most valuable in a free country—is 
preserved to every one accused of crime who is not attached to the 
army, or navy, or militia in actual service.  The sixth amendment 
affirms that “in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury,” 
language broad enough to embrace all persons and cases . . . .28 
Thus, Justice Davis concluded that the right to jury trial could not be 
denied to anyone charged in a U.S. court, so long as the courts are 
open and unobstructed.29 
The Court continued along this line of reasoning by incorporating 
the Jury Trial Clause against the states in Duncan v. Louisiana.30  In 
Duncan, the Court was faced with the question of whether a state 
government could constitutionally circumvent the right to a jury in a 
criminal proceeding where the defendant, if convicted, faced up to 
two years in prison.31  Writing for a 7–2 Court,32 Justice White’s 
                                                 
 23. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (listing 
deprivation of the right to jury trial as a grievance against the King). 
 24. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 21, at 870 (observing that the right to jury 
trial is the only right conferred both in the body of the Constitution and in the Bill of 
Rights); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional 
Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2052 (2008) (positing that the right 
to jury trial’s position in both Article III and the Sixth Amendment embeds the role 
of the jury in the framework of American government). 
 25. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 26. Id. at 118. 
 27. See id. at 122 (stating that a “guarantee of freedom” was broken by denying 
Milligan the protection of the Jury Trial Clause). 
 28. Id. at 123. 
 29. See id. at 127 (arguing that the right to jury trial could only constitutionally be 
withheld when doing so is absolutely necessary). 
 30. 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968). 
 31. See id. at 146 (describing the sentencing guidelines for simple battery under 
Louisiana state law). 
 32. The point of disagreement that sparked a dissent from Justices Harlan and 
Stewart was not over the fundamental nature of the Jury Trial Clause, but rather over 
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opinion rehashed the functions of the jury trial—preventing 
oppressive government action and preserving the underlying fairness 
of U.S. criminal proceedings—that the Framers found so valuable.33  
Justice White then concluded that the right to jury trial in all serious 
criminal cases34 is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,”35 
and cannot be suspended via state law.36 
Despite the crucial role of the Jury Trial Clause in U.S. criminal 
proceedings, there are certain circumstances under which it can be 
withheld.  For example, the Supreme Court held in Solorio v. United 
States37 that the government can subject members of the U.S. military 
to trial without the protection of the Jury Trial Clause for crimes 
alleged to have taken place during their time of service.38  However, 
this exception is limited strictly to defendants who are service 
members at the time charges are brought.  This distinction was 
highlighted in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,39 where the Court 
held that the Jury Trial Clause extended to a defendant who was 
charged with a murder that took place during his service in Korea 
because the defendant was not arrested until five months after he was 
honorably discharged.40  The Court in Toth also spoke more generally 
about the right to jury trial, stating that this particular right “ranks 
                                                 
the amount of latitude given to states in determining how to adjudicate 
misdemeanor offenses.  See id. at 171–72 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The question 
before us is not whether jury trial is an ancient institution, which it is; nor whether it 
plays a significant role in the administration of criminal justice, which it does; not 
whether it will endure, which it shall.”). 
 33. See id. at 152 (majority opinion) (relaying a declaration by the First Congress 
of the American Colonies in 1765 that the right to jury trial is an “inherent and 
invaluable right”). 
 34. Duncan had been charged with simple battery, a misdemeanor in Louisiana 
punishable by a $300 fine and up to two years in prison.  Id. at 146.  The Court 
identified this charge as “serious,” notwithstanding its classification as a 
misdemeanor or the fact that Duncan was only sentenced to sixty days in prison.  See 
id. at 159 (arguing that the penalty given for a particular crime is highly relevant in 
determining whether the crime should be considered “serious”). 
 35. Id. at 149. 
 36. See id. at 148 (mandating that the Jury Trial Clause be implemented 
uniformly between federal and state law). 
 37. 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
 38. Id. at 450–51 (stating that Congress’s Article I, section 8, clause 14 power to 
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” 
grants Congress the ability to try U.S. servicemembers by military commission 
without a jury). 
 39. 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 
 40. See id. at 22–23 (stating that servicemembers who have severed all ties with 
the armed forces are subject to full constitutional protections). 
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very high in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards”41 and should 
not be withheld absent a compelling reason to do so.42 
The Court identified an additional circumstance under which the 
right to jury trial may be withheld in Quirin.  In Quirin, eight German 
saboteurs were captured in the United States and charged with 
violating several provisions of the Articles of War.43  Pursuant to an 
Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt, the trial was 
conducted by a military commission without the benefit of a jury.44  
The Supreme Court upheld Roosevelt’s denial of the right to jury for 
the defendants, holding that the Jury Trial Clause is inapplicable to 
enemy combatants charged with violating the laws of war.45  Whatever 
the merits of this decision,46 Quirin has been followed as precedent in 
several post-World War II Supreme Court decisions.47 
                                                 
 41. Id. at 16. 
 42. Id. at 23 n.22 (“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such 
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that 
any seeming curtailment of the right to jury trial should be scrutinized with the 
utmost care.”). 
 43. Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1942) (providing that the defendants were 
charged with violations of Article 81, corresponding or giving intelligence to the 
enemy, Article 82, spying, and conspiracy). 
 44. Id. (referring to Roosevelt’s declaration and recognizing that it denied access 
to the courts and subjected all citizens of countries with which the United States was 
at war and who were charged with “committing or attempting or preparing to 
commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the laws of war” 
to the jurisdiction of the military courts).  It should be noted here that the events in 
Quirin took place during a formally declared war, giving the President expanded 
powers in his role as Commander in Chief.  See id. at 26 (“The Constitution thus 
invests the President as Commander in Chief with the power to wage war which 
Congress has declared . . . .”).  However, the Court did not rely very heavily on the 
President’s expanded powers, choosing instead to base its decision on the 
defendants’ status as combatants and the nature of the offenses with which they were 
charged. 
 45. See id. at 41 (asserting that enemy belligerents charged with offenses against 
the law of war are not entitled to constitutional protections).  The Court argued that 
trying enemy spies without a jury was consistent with traditional practice, citing a 
provision from the 1806 Articles of War authorizing the death penalty for enemy 
spies sentenced by a general court martial without the benefit of a jury.  Id.  But see 
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. 
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295, 317–18 (2010) (observing that the 1806 Articles of War is 
the only statutory authority cited in Quirin to support the Court’s decision to 
withhold a jury from enemy spies). 
 46. Quirin has been sharply criticized by judges and academics alike.  See, e.g., 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the 
decision in Quirin as “not this Court’s finest hour”); G. Edward White, Felix 
Frankfurter’s ‘Soliloquy’ in Ex Parte Quirin:  Nazi Sabotage & Constitutional Conundrums, 
5 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 436 (2002) (noting that Justice Frankfurter—despite joining 
Chief Justice Stone’s opinion—later referred to Quirin as “not a happy precedent”); 
Vladeck, supra note 45, at 341 (describing Quirin as an “unfortunate decision borne 
out of unique and fortuitous circumstances”). 
 47. See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 354–55 (1952) (upholding 
the use of a military commission without a jury in a German occupation court); 
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B. The Extraterritorial Constitution 
Equally important to this discussion is the extent to which the Jury 
Trial Clause—along with the rest of the Constitution—has been held 
to apply overseas.  The Supreme Court’s modern extraterritoriality 
jurisprudence began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in a line of cases known as the Insular Cases.48  These cases 
addressed the scope of the Constitution’s applicability in territories 
that the United States acquired following the Spanish-American 
war.49  The solution that the Court reached, which was later referred 
to as “territorial incorporation,”50 was to deal with each territory 
based on whether it was destined for statehood.51  In the territories 
destined to become states—which were categorized as incorporated 
territories—the Court held that the Constitution applied in full.52  In 
areas not destined for statehood, however, the Court held that the 
only provisions of the Constitution that applied were those that were 
deemed fundamental.53  The Court declined to extend the Jury Trial 
Clause to several of these unincorporated territories—including 
Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines—during this time, albeit 
based upon considerations almost wholly separate from whether the 
right to jury trial was fundamental.54 
                                                 
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25 (1946) (declining to grant a jury trial to a Japanese 
general charged with war crimes in the Philippines). 
 48. This Comment will focus on the four Insular Cases that dealt specifically with 
jury trials.  See supra note 18 (describing the Court’s early position on the right to jury 
trial as expressed in Downes, Mankichi, Dorr, and Balzac). 
 49. See Ramos, supra note 18, at 226 (explaining that the United States acquired 
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Cuba in 1898). 
 50. Id. at 248 (recounting the process by which the Supreme Court distinguished 
between incorporated and unincorporated territories to determine which 
constitutional provisions would apply to a given territory). 
 51. See Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States, Puerto Rico, and the Territorial 
Incorporation Doctrine:  Reaching a Century of Constitutional Authoritarianism, 31 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 55, 75 (1997) (describing Justice White’s belief that a given 
territory’s relationship to the United States should dictate the measure of 
constitutional protection that the territory receives). 
 52. See id. (positing that territories intended to become states were considered 
part of the United States and were accordingly given access to the entire arsenal of 
constitutional rights). 
 53. See id. (stating that territories the United States held briefly and did not 
intend to grant independence in the future were not part of the United States but 
were “merely appurtenant thereto as a possession,” and therefore were only entitled 
to the “‘general prohibitions’ in the Constitution protecting the liberty and property 
of the people” (quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341–42 (1901) (White, J., 
concurring))). 
 54. See infra notes 55–78 and accompanying text (discussing the main factors that 
the Court took into account when declining to extend the Jury Trial Clause to 
unincorporated territories in the Insular Cases, such as the practical limitations of 
replacing the indigenous legal system). 
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The Supreme Court’s guidance on the right to jury trial in the 
Insular Cases began with Downes v. Bidwell,55 when the Court first 
considered Puerto Rico’s legal status as a newly acquired territory.56  
In Downes, the Court stated—separately from its actual holding57—
that not all constitutional provisions apply in all circumstances in 
every U.S. territory.58  The distinction that the Court originally made 
in Downes was between “natural” rights59 conferred in the 
Constitution and “remedial rights which are peculiar to [the 
American] system of jurisprudence.”60  According to the Court, the 
right to jury trial was the latter.61 
The Court more directly addressed the right to jury trial 
extraterritorially two years later in Hawaii v. Mankichi.62  However, the 
main issue for the Court in Mankichi was not whether the right to jury 
was fundamental, but whether it would be appropriate to substitute a 
traditional jury trial, as required by the Sixth Amendment, for the 
equivalent criminal procedure already in place in Hawaii at the 
time.63  For a 5–4 Court, and over several strong dissenting opinions,64 
                                                 
 55. 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
 56. Id. at 247–48 (plurality opinion) (analyzing whether the newly-acquired 
territory of Puerto Rico was a foreign country for purposes of the Foraker Act). 
 57. The Court in Downes spoke in part to the extraterritorial Constitution in 
general, but its main concern was Puerto Rico’s status as a territory for purposes of 
tariff legislation.  See id. at 247–48 (specifying the main issue in the case as being 
whether merchandise brought to New York from Puerto Rico was exempt from 
duties under the Foraker Act); see also Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) 
(Peckham, J., concurring in the result) (stating that Downes is only good authority for 
determining recovery of duties under the Foraker Act). 
 58. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 279 (opining that Congress’s power to acquire 
territories includes the power to determine the specific terms of the territories’ 
governance). 
 59. See id. at 282–83 (asserting that certain rights, including freedom of speech 
and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, are conferred “naturally” on 
everyone within U.S. jurisdiction). 
 60. See id. (explaining that remedial rights include the rights to citizenship, to 
suffrage, and to procedural methods found in the Constitution, “which are peculiar 
to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and . . . held by the states to be unnecessary to the 
proper protection of individuals”). 
 61. See id. at 270–71 (holding that the Constitution does not apply to trials 
conducted by foreign legal systems and that, therefore, Congress can “provide for 
such trials before consular tribunals, without the intervention of a grand or petit 
jury”).  While the Court did not explicitly state that the right to jury trial is remedial, 
declining to grant Downes a jury trial implies that the Court believed it to be a 
remedial right.  See id. at 282–83 (suggesting that natural rights cannot be withheld 
or infringed upon under any circumstances). 
 62. 190 U.S. 197 (1903). 
 63. See id. at 211 (explaining that the municipal legislation of the islands did 
not include the common law concepts of the grand and petit jury); see also 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008) (noting that the former Spanish 
colonies at issue in the Insular Cases had no experience with the use of grand and 
petit juries).  The defendant’s specific issue in Mankichi was that he had been 
convicted pursuant to a verdict by only nine of twelve jurors, which was permissible 
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Justice Brown concluded that such a substitution would be 
unnecessary.65  The Mankichi Court therefore held that the difficulties 
inherent in establishing an Anglo-American jury trial system in a 
court otherwise governed by civil law made it inappropriate to extend 
the Jury Trial Clause to the Hawaiian Islands.66 
The doctrine of territorial incorporation was formally introduced 
in 1904 in Dorr v. United States,67 where, similar to Mankichi, the Court 
declined to implement a jury trial system in the Philippine Islands.68  
Writing for the majority, Justice Day argued that it would be 
unreasonable to replace a territory’s criminal system with more 
constitutionally acceptable methods if that territory was not intended 
to become a part of the United States.69  In this specific instance, 
Justice Day noted Congress’s intent not to keep the Philippines as a 
territory70 as evidence that implementing a jury trial system would be 
inappropriate.71  Thus, Justice Day argued that the right to jury trial 
was inapplicable in the Philippines.72 
The final installment of the Insular Cases came in 1922 in Balzac v. 
Porto Rico.73  In Balzac, the Court denied a jury trial to a Puerto Rican 
newspaper editor facing misdemeanor libel charges.74  In his opinion, 
Chief Justice Taft reaffirmed the proposition that the Constitution 
                                                 
under Hawaii’s civil-law system but would have been insufficient under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 212. 
 64. See Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 225–26 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that 
conviction by a unanimous jury is among the fundamental rights guaranteed to 
everyone living within U.S. jurisdiction); see also id. at 238 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]t cannot . . . be said, with any show of reason, that the constitutional provision 
relating to petit juries was inapplicable in Hawaii after its annexation to this 
country.”). 
 65. See id. at 218 (majority opinion) (refusing to upend Hawaii’s existing jury 
trial system that, in the eyes of the Court, was already well suited to preserve the 
rights of the Hawaiian population). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 195 U.S. 138 (1904). 
 68. See id. at 144 (relying on Mankichi in stating that implementing jury trials 
would be unnecessarily disruptive). 
 69. See id. at 148 (arguing that forcing all U.S. territories to adopt the jury trial 
system regardless of past practice would be more disruptive than beneficial when the 
existing system of jurisprudence was “fair,” “orderly,” and “long-established”). 
 70. See id. at 143–44 (explaining that Congress had taken legislative action to 
grant certain “organized” territories constitutional protection but had explicitly 
excluded the Philippines from this category). 
 71. See id. at 149 (arguing that Congress should have the final word in 
determining the appropriate steps to take in establishing local territorial 
governments). 
 72. See id. (holding that without supporting legislation, the Jury Trial Clause does 
not automatically extend to trials conducted in the Philippines). 
 73. 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
 74. See id. at 300.  Puerto Rican procedure at the time granted jury trials only to 
defendants in felony cases.  Id.  Under Puerto Rican law, a felony was defined as a 
crime punishable either by death or imprisonment.  Id. at 302. 
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does not apply of its own force in unincorporated territories75 and 
that Puerto Rico was an unincorporated territory under Downes.76  
After finding that Congress had not taken any action to incorporate 
Puerto Rico since Downes was decided,77 the Court denied Balzac’s 
request for a jury trial.78 
The Supreme Court revisited the extraterritorial application of the 
right to jury trial thirty-five years after the conclusion of the Insular 
Cases in Reid v. Covert.79  Writing for the plurality, Justice Black held 
that the Bill of Rights protected two women, who were U.S. citizens, 
on trial for the murder of their husbands on a U.S. Air Force Base in 
Great Britain.80  Justice Black additionally stated that the defendants’ 
rights to jury trial could not be withdrawn in this case by treaty81 or by 
Congress via the Necessary and Proper Clause.82  Justices Frankfurter 
and Harlan each concurred in the judgment separately on the 
narrower ground that the defendants could not be tried without a 
jury for capital offenses overseas.83 
                                                 
 75. See id. at 305 (stating that the Jury Trial Clause does not extend to 
unincorporated territories (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 306 (noting the absence of a plain statement of Congressional intent 
to incorporate Puerto Rico in any legislation between 1900 and 1922). 
 78. See id. at 312–13 (holding that the right to jury trial is not among the rights 
intended to be extended to Puerto Rico). 
 79. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 80. See id. at 20 (plurality opinion) (reasoning that the Jury Trial Clause 
attaches as tightly at a U.S. military post overseas as it would within the territorial 
United States). 
 81. Id. at 17 (acknowledging that the government’s power to make treaties is 
limited by the guarantees enshrined in the Constitution). 
 82. Id. at 20.  Because the defendants were family members of U.S. 
servicemembers and were living on military bases, the government argued that 
Congress could deem it “necessary and proper” to subject them to trial by military 
commission as if they were members of the military themselves.  Id.  The Court 
rejected this argument, holding that such an outcome would be “inconsistent with 
both the letter and spirit of the constitution.”  Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 83. Id. at 45 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (emphasizing that the 
narrow question before the Court was whether civilian dependents of U.S. 
servicemembers could be tried without a jury in capital cases during peacetime); 
id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (positing that the right to jury was 
too significant in capital cases to be withheld simply because the trial took place 
outside the United States).  The concurrences written by Justices Frankfurter and 
Harlan left open the possibility that the Jury Trial Clause could be suspended in 
cases involving lesser offenses.  See id. at 77–78 (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
result) (joining the Court’s opinion only as it applied to capital cases).  However, 
this possibility was closed off three years later when the Court extended Reid to 
include non-capital offenses.  See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 
234, 242–43 (1960) (noting the lack of a constitutional distinction between capital 
and non-capital offenses). 
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Justice Harlan’s concurrence in particular focused on the practical 
implications of applying a constitutional right extraterritorially.84  
This analysis stemmed largely from an innovative reading of the 
Insular Cases; rather than finding that the Insular Cases preclude the 
right to jury trial from applying overseas,85 Justice Harlan interpreted 
the cases as standing for the proposition that certain constitutional 
provisions do not necessarily apply extraterritorially in all 
circumstances.86  Using this functional approach, Justice Harlan 
stated that “the particular local setting, the practical necessities, and 
the possible alternatives” were all valid considerations in determining 
the reach of the Constitution, and that extending a certain right 
would be appropriate where doing so would not be “altogether 
impracticable and anomalous.”87  Thus, while Justice Harlan believed 
that, in some circumstances, civilians on military bases overseas could 
be subject to trial without a jury, he concluded that the right to a jury 
was too significant in capital cases for the Jury Trial Clause to be 
withheld in Reid.88 
Having been put to rest by Reid and its progeny for a number of 
years, the concept of extraterritoriality did not arise again until 1990 
with United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.89  By a 6–3 vote, the Court held 
that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred during a warrantless 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) search of a non-citizen’s 
home in Mexico,90 though the majority was sharply divided as to the 
decision’s scope.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a majority opinion 
stating that the defendant, as a non-citizen who did not previously 
have any significant voluntary connection to the United States, had 
no right to claim any constitutional protection for a search that took 
place extraterritorially.91  Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, 
                                                 
 84. Reid, 354 U.S. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (noting the Court’s 
error in reading precedent to mean that the right to jury trial either categorically 
does or does not apply overseas). 
 85. See id. (rejecting a reading of the Insular Cases that categorically bars jury 
trials for American citizens tried abroad). 
 86. Id. at 74. 
 87. Id. at 74–75. 
 88. See id. at 77–78 (analogizing the right to jury trial in capital cases to the 
government’s concession that allegations of treason are so grave that they should be 
heard in U.S. courts, notwithstanding any potential difficulties that would accompany 
such a hearing). 
 89. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 90. Id. at 274–75. 
 91. See id. at 271–72 (arguing that the defendant’s lawful but involuntary 
presence in the United States was not a sufficient ground to establish a substantial 
connection).  But see Neuman, supra note 2, at 272 (“Abducting an innocent 
foreigner and then denying him all constitutional protection precisely because he 
was abducted is too perverse a doctrine to maintain in the modern era.”). 
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agreeing that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred but 
suggesting that the majority swept too broadly by saying that the 
defendant was not entitled to any constitutional protection.92 
Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion—which is 
typically viewed as the controlling opinion of the case93—that 
questioned the broad strokes drawn by the majority.  Unlike the 
previous two opinions, however, Justice Kennedy sought to define the 
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution based on government 
action.94  Justice Kennedy speculated that non-citizens could in 
certain circumstances be afforded additional constitutional rights 
once the U.S. government had affirmatively commenced criminal 
proceedings against them, even absent any previous connection to 
the United States.95  Justice Kennedy also took issue with the 
majority’s assertion that the Constitution offered no protection to the 
defendant.96  Quoting heavily from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Reid, Justice Kennedy concluded that the correct measure of 
protection that the Constitution requires turns on the question of 
what process is “due” to a defendant in particular circumstances.97  
Justice Kennedy’s use of the functional approach led him to agree 
with the majority in its conclusion that extending Fourth 
Amendment protection to this particular defendant would be 
“impracticable and anomalous.”98 
                                                 
 92. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(arguing that non-citizens who are lawfully present in the United States are entitled 
to seek the protection of the Fourth Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights).  
Justice Stevens further speculated that the defendant in Verdugo-Urquidez should be 
within the scope of Fourth Amendment protection because he was brought into the 
United States against his will.  Id. 
 93. See Michael Bahar, As Necessity Creates the Rule:  Eisentrager, Boumediene, and 
the Enemy—How Strategic Realities Can Constitutionally Require Greater Rights for Detainees 
in the Wars of the Twenty-First Century, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 315 (2009) (observing 
that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez is widely viewed as the 
controlling opinion on the issue of constitutional extraterritoriality). 
 94. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (positing that the 
government’s action in reference to an alien should be the correct medium for 
determining constitutional protection). 
 95. See id. at 278 (“The United States is prosecuting a foreign national in a court 
established under Article III, and all of the trial proceedings are governed by the 
Constitution.  All would agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant.”). 
 96. See id. (noting that the Court’s decision was specific to the Fourth 
Amendment and did not preclude similarly situated individuals from invoking any 
form of constitutional protection). 
 97. See id. (stating that even the majority accepted that the defendant was entitled 
to Fifth Amendment protections due to his trial in a U.S. court). 
 98. Id.  The factors that led Justice Kennedy to this conclusion included “[t]he 
absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing and 
perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail 
abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials.”  Id. 
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C. Brief History and Legal Status of Guantanamo Bay 
While Cuba maintains de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay,99 
the area has never actually been under Cuban control.100  Spain 
relinquished control of the entire island of Cuba to the United States 
in 1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War,101 and the United 
States held the area “in trust” until the Cuban Republic was formed 
in 1902.102  At that time, the United States formally transferred 
control of the island to the Cuban government but retained control 
of Guantanamo Bay pursuant to a lease agreement between the two 
countries.103  The agreement was later amended to require consent 
from both the United States and Cuba in order to alter or abrogate 
its terms.104  The lease agreement did not contain a time frame for 
the termination of U.S. control or any other indication that control 
of the area will revert back to Cuba in the foreseeable future.105 
The Guantanamo Bay detention center has housed 779 detainees 
since it was opened in 2002.106  As of February 2013, 166 detainees 
having citizenship in twenty-seven countries were being held in the 
detention center.107  Detainees were transferred into Guantanamo as 
recently as 2008, though most have been detained there since 2002.108  
Outside the detention center, Guantanamo Bay naval base is a self-
sufficient military base with an independent water plant, school 
                                                 
 99. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004) (recognizing Cuba’s ultimate 
sovereignty over the Guantanamo Bay area). 
 100. See Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2536 
(2005) (noting that the lease for Guantanamo Bay was drafted by the U.S. while it 
still formally controlled Cuba and was implemented immediately upon granting 
Cuba its independence). 
 101. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (noting Spain’s specific 
relinquishment of “all claim[s] of sovereignty and . . . title” to the United States 
(alteration in original) (quoting Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, art. I, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 
Stat. 1755)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Cuban-American Treaty, U.S.-Cuba, art. 3, Feb. 16–23, 1903, T.S. No. 418 
[hereinafter 1903 Lease Agreement] (allowing the United States to exercise 
“complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo for the duration of the lease). 
 104. See Treaty on Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. 3, May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 
1682 [hereinafter 1934 Lease Agreement] (stating that the terms of the 1903 Lease 
Agreement were to remain in effect indefinitely absent a contrary agreement 
between the United States and Cuba or an abandonment of the area by the United 
States). 
 105. See id. (noting that any transfer of ownership or reversion back to Cuban 
control would require consent from both parties). 
 106. The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES & NPR, http://projects.nytimes.com/ 
Guantanamo (last updated Dec. 11, 2012). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. (noting that more than 75% of the detainees currently being held at 
Guantanamo are in their tenth year of detention). 
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system, transportation system, and entertainment facilities.109  The 
atmosphere of the base—at least in terms of the U.S. servicemembers 
and their families stationed there—has been described as “small-town 
America.”110 
The Supreme Court has held that certain constitutional provisions 
attach in the Guantanamo detention center.  For example, in 
Boumediene, the Court stated both that the Suspension Clause111 “has 
full effect” in Guantanamo,112 and that the Guantanamo detainees 
are entitled to due process (albeit in a limited form).113  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Kennedy came to this conclusion first by 
dismissing the notion that the Constitution does not apply because 
the United States does not retain formal sovereignty over 
Guantanamo.114  Justice Kennedy stated that although Cuba 
maintained ultimate sovereignty over the area, the plenary control 
that the United States exercised over Guantanamo confirmed the 
United States as its de facto sovereign.115  For this reason, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that Guantanamo should not be considered 
“abroad” for purposes of constitutional analysis.116 
The Court’s decision in Boumediene rejected the government’s 
formalistic arguments117 in favor of a functional approach to 
extraterritoriality.118  Through this approach, Justice Kennedy 
asserted that the Constitution has independent force outside the 
                                                 
 109. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 35 
(2004). 
 110. Carol Rosenberg, New Chief Brings Guantanamo Up to Date, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 
25, 2003, at A15. 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”). 
 112. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
 113. See id. at 785 (holding that the risk of error in the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (CBST) conducted at Guantanamo was so high as to constitute a violation 
of the detainees’ due process rights).  The Court made clear in Boumediene that the 
detainees are entitled to some due process rights, though it never explicitly detailed 
the extent to which the Due Process Clause applies.  See id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 114. See id. at 754 (majority opinion) (asserting that Cuba’s de jure sovereignty 
over Guantanamo Bay does not preclude further inquiry into the level of control that 
Cuba actually exerts over the area). 
 115. See id. at 755 (calling attention to the “obvious and uncontested fact” that the 
United States exercises complete control over Guantanamo Bay). 
 116. See id. at 769. 
 117. See id. at 739 (recounting the government’s contention that non-citizens 
designated as enemy combatants and held outside the territorial United States are 
not afforded any constitutional rights). 
 118. See id. at 764 (emphasizing reliance on “objective factors and practical 
concerns, not formalism” as the common theme of the Court’s modern 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence). 
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United States,119 but that case-specific practical difficulties should be 
taken into account when determining the Constitution’s 
extraterritorial scope.120  Specifically, Justice Kennedy found that the 
difficulties inherent in extending the Suspension Clause to 
Guantanamo were not particularly severe and that affording the right 
to detainees at Guantanamo would not be “impracticable or 
anomalous.”121 
The right to jury trial in the context of Guantanamo Bay has never 
been discussed by the Supreme Court, but has been addressed by 
lower courts in several instances.  In United States v. Al Bahlul,122 the 
U.S. Court of Military Commission Review considered whether the 
Jury Trial Clause extended to a Yemeni citizen on trial for several 
alleged offenses stemming from his role as a member of al Qaeda.123  
Relying primarily on Quirin,124 the court declined to extend the Jury 
Trial Clause on the ground that Al Bahlul was an enemy combatant125 
and that his conduct amounted to a violation of the laws of war.126  
The case has since been appealed and is currently pending in the 
D.C. Circuit Court.127 
                                                 
 119. See id. at 757 (acknowledging that, at least in some circumstances, the 
Constitution applies extraterritorially and without legislative support). 
 120. Id. at 764 (echoing the functionalist tests emphasized by the Court in Reid 
and in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez). 
 121. See id. at 770 (stating that the difficulties of implementing the Suspension 
Clause in Guantanamo were too few to justify denying detainees the right to invoke 
habeas corpus). 
 122. 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc), vacated, No. 11-1324 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 25, 2013). 
 123. See id. at 1161 (indicating al Bahlul’s direct communication with Osama bin 
Laden and his participation in al Qaeda’s media office).  By his own admission, al 
Bahlul had extensive connections with al Qaeda and created a video designed to 
recruit new members to participate in al Qaeda’s jihad against the United States.  Id.  
Charges against al Bahlul included providing material support for terrorism, 
conspiracy to commit murder and other terrorist acts, and solicitation to recruit 
others to do the same.  Id. at 1159. 
 124. See id. at 1166–67 (identifying the main issue of the case as being similar to 
that in Quirin; namely, whether the government is constitutionally permitted to try 
the defendant before a military commission without the benefit of a jury). 
 125. See id. at 1188 (finding the defendant to be an alien unlawful enemy 
combatant under the Military Commissions Act of 2006). 
 126. See id. at 1217–18 (concluding that membership in an international terrorist 
organization is an offense against the law of armed conflict and is triable without the 
benefit of a jury). 
 127. See Al Bahlul, Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 17 (arguing that the Court of 
Military Commission Review’s reliance on Quirin was misplaced and that al Bahlul is 
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial). 
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II. THE JURY TRIAL CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT APPLIES IN 
GUANTANAMO BAY 
There is no precedent that would support a categorical bar of the 
Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo Bay.  While several of the Insular 
Cases declined to extend the Jury Trial Clause extraterritorially, the 
rationale of each case was so circumstance-specific that none is 
controlling in the context of Guantanamo Bay.128  However, when 
considering the doctrine of territorial incorporation left behind by 
the Insular Cases collectively, and because the right to jury trial is 
fundamental, the Jury Trial Clause should attach in Guantanamo.  
Additionally, the applicability of the Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo 
is further validated by an analysis of Justice Harlan’s impracticable 
and anomalous test, which was originally used in Reid and was 
recently employed in Boumediene. 
Further, while the exception created in Quirin—removing the right 
to jury trial for enemy combatants charged with violating the law of 
war—would certainly apply to some Guantanamo detainees, it does 
not serve as a categorical rule because it is based on both the status of 
the offender and the nature of the offense charged.129  To that end, 
the government’s reliance on Quirin in Guantanamo Bay cases such 
as Al Bahlul presupposes that the Jury Trial Clause would apply to 
defendants who do not meet Quirin’s specific requirements.130  
Moreover, the language of the Jury Trial Clause, and the underlying 
fairness that it provides to all U.S. criminal proceedings, further 
suggests that the Jury Trial Clause should attach in Guantanamo.131  
As a result, categorically withholding the right to jury trial from all 
Guantanamo detainees would violate the Jury Trial Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment. 
                                                 
 128. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 247 (1901) (examining whether 
certain goods transported from Puerto Rico to New York were exempt from duties 
under the Foraker Act). 
 129. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1942) (stressing that the defendants’ 
status as “admitted enemy invaders” and the nature of the charges as offenses 
“against the law of war” supported the decision that a military commission was an 
appropriate tribunal). 
 130. See id. at 29 (noting that there are certain offenses against the laws of war that 
are not triable by a military tribunal and are constitutionally triable only by jury); Al 
Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (citing Quirin, 371 U.S. at 29). 
 131. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (identifying the right to 
jury trial as being “fundamental to the American scheme of justice”); see also supra 
Part I.A (outlining the significance of the Jury Trial Clause in criminal proceedings 
and stressing its pivotal role in the U.S. legal system). 
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A. The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation Supports the Application of the 
Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo Bay 
The first barrier to extending the Jury Trial Clause to 
Guantanamo—both analytically and chronologically—is the 
precedent created by the Insular Cases.132  If Guantanamo Bay is not 
destined for statehood, and the right to jury trial has already been 
deemed not fundamental, then at first glance the Insular Cases would 
seem to suggest that the Jury Trial Clause should not apply.133  
However, there are several significant factual distinctions between the 
Insular Cases and the question at issue in this Comment.  The most 
important of these differences is that the Insular Cases focused more 
on case-specific practical hindrances to the Jury Trial Clause’s 
application rather than focusing on the fundamental nature of the 
right itself.134  Importantly, none of the practical considerations 
discussed in the Insular Cases presents a problem in the context of 
Guantanamo.135  Further, in light of the considerable examples in 
U.S. jurisprudence regarding the right to jury trial as fundamental, 
the doctrine left behind by the Insular Cases collectively hints strongly 
in favor of granting Guantanamo detainees the right to jury trial.136 
1. None of the specific holdings from the Insular Cases preclude the 
 application of the Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo Bay 
As previously stated, there is a significant difference between the 
specific holdings of each of the Insular Cases and the precedent left 
behind by the doctrine collectively.  This distinction is most evident 
                                                 
 132. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 286 (offering the Insular Cases as the primary 
reason that the right to jury would have some difficulty attaching to defendants held 
in Guantanamo). 
 133. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s 
decision not to implement the right to jury trial in territories not destined for 
statehood). 
 134. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757–59 (2008) (detailing the limiting 
factors considered in the Insular Cases, such as the instability and uncertainty 
resulting from implementing a completely foreign legal system, despite an 
understanding that the Constitution must extend to the territories to some extent). 
 135. Cf. id. at 768 (explaining that there were no practical obstacles, like those 
described in the Insular Cases, to enforcing the Suspension Clause of the Constitution 
in Guantanamo because unlike the territories at issue in the Insular Cases, 
Guantanamo is not a “transient possession” where temporarily enforcing the 
Constitution would be pointless). 
 136. See id. at 758 (explaining that constitutional provisions could still apply in 
unincorporated territories if the ties between the United States and those 
territories were to strengthen over time (citing Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 
475–76 (1979))); see also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (explaining 
that even in unincorporated territories, the United States was bound to provide 
non-citizen inhabitants “guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights 
declared in the Constitution”). 
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in the cases concerning jury trials.  The Spanish civil-law system 
employed by the territories at issue in the Insular Cases contained a 
completely different set of criminal procedure rules than the 
common-law system used in the United States.137  These two systems 
conflicted in such a way that certain constitutional protections—
including the Jury Trial Clause—were not able to apply seamlessly in 
the territories.138  Viewed in this light, the Court’s decision not to 
extend the Jury Trial Clause in the Insular Cases can be understood as 
an issue of cultural inappropriateness rather than a comment on the 
right to jury trial.139  In other words, the question that these cases 
turned on was not whether the right to jury trial was fundamental, 
but rather whether it could be incorporated into a particular 
territory’s legal system without causing a significant disruption.140 
In the context of Guantanamo Bay, there is little local culture to 
disturb.  Unlike the territories in the Insular Cases, courts in 
Guantanamo Bay are established and governed pursuant to U.S. 
law.141  The area is inhabited chiefly by U.S. servicemembers working 
on the base and their families.142  In fact, there is very little separating 
Guantanamo Bay from a military base in the territorial United 
States.143  These factual distinctions suggest that the “wholly dissimilar 
                                                 
 137. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757 (noting that the Spanish colonies in the 
Insular Cases had no experience with the use of grand or petit juries before being 
introduced to the American common-law system). 
 138. See id. (noting that the territorial incorporation doctrine stemmed from the 
Court’s “reluctan[ce] to risk the uncertainty and instability that could result from a 
rule that displaced altogether the existing legal systems in these newly acquired 
Territories”). 
 139. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 269 (noting the Court’s hesitancy to impose the 
Jury Trial Clause in the Insular Cases in part because of a possible negative impact on 
societies that were not accustomed to it). 
 140. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 211 (1903) (concluding that the 
process in place in Hawaii was so similar to the Anglo-American jury trial that their 
need for Sixth Amendment protection did not outweigh the disruption that would 
follow from its implementation).  The distinction between fundamentality and 
practicality makes Justice Kennedy’s classification of the Insular Cases in Boumediene 
easier to reconcile.  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (describing the Insular Cases as 
devising “a doctrine that allowed [the Court] to use its power sparingly and where it 
would be most needed”).  Assuming, as the court appears to have done in Mankichi, 
that the existing fact-finding methods employed in the Hawaiian Islands at the time 
offered similar protection to that of a jury trial, the need to incorporate the Jury 
Trial Clause would not have been particularly dire.  See Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 218 
(describing the Hawaiian equivalent to a jury trial as “well calculated to conserve the 
rights of their citizens to their lives, their property and their well being”). 
 141. See Neuman, supra note 109, at 39 (stating that the United States is 
“accountable only to itself” in Guantanamo). 
 142. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text (describing the population 
and living conditions of the military base at Guantanamo Bay). 
 143. See Neuman, supra note 109, at 35 (comparing the Guantanamo Bay area to a 
similarly populated area in “small-town America” (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 110)). 
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traditions and institutions” that hindered the application of the Jury 
Trial Clause in the Insular Cases would likely not be an issue in 
Guantanamo.144 
Another distinguishing factor is the time period for which the 
United States intends to retain control over Guantanamo.  In the 
Insular Cases, the United States held many of the unincorporated 
territories temporarily but intended to grant them independence 
shortly thereafter.145  This was a significant contributing factor in the 
Court’s decision that it would be unnecessary to implement the Jury 
Trial Clause.146  Conversely, “[t]he authority of the United States at 
Guantanamo is plenary, exclusive, secure, and temporally 
indefinite.”147  The lease granting the United States control over 
Guantanamo makes no mention of a possible reversion back to 
Cuba,148 and there has been no indication that the United States 
plans to cede control of Guantanamo in the foreseeable future.149 
An additional distinction between the Insular Cases and the trials in 
Guantanamo is the locality of the offenses with which the defendants 
have been charged.  The Insular Cases all concerned local offenses 
that took place while the defendants were present within their 
respective territories.150  Conversely, the offenses with which most 
Guantanamo detainees have been charged can by no means be 
considered “local.”151  The detainees in Guantanamo have all been 
transported there from other parts of the world to stand trial for 
                                                 
 144. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 145. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757 (asserting that there was no need for the 
Court in Dorr to implement the Jury Trial Clause in the Philippines because the 
United States intended to recognize the Philippines’ independence once it 
established a stable government). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 
399 (2009). 
 148. See 1903 Lease Agreement, supra note 103, art. 1 (giving the United States 
control over Guantanamo Bay “for the time required for the purposes of coaling and 
naval stations,” without mention of a possible end date).  Additionally, article 3 of the 
1903 Lease Agreement grants complete control of the Guantanamo Bay area to the 
United States “during the period of the occupation,” again making no mention of a 
time limit for U.S. control.  Id. art. 3. 
 149. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text (describing the extensive 
detention center and military base still in use at Guantanamo Bay). 
 150. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 203 (1903) (noting that the 
defendant stood trial for a murder committed within Hawaiian jurisdiction). 
 151. Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006) (plurality 
opinion) (involving a detainee captured in Afghanistan and charged with crimes 
alleged to have taken place in several countries in the area but who would be 
tried in Guantanamo), with Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 300 (1922) 
(concerning a Puerto Rican citizen being charged with libel that allegedly took 
place in Puerto Rico). 
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crimes committed abroad.152  This lack of connection between the 
Guantanamo detainees and the land where they are being detained 
further distinguishes the Guantanamo trials from the Insular Cases 
and thereby weakens the precedential value any of the Insular Cases 
may have. 
The conclusion that the Insular Cases are not individually 
controlling seems to have been followed by lower courts as well.  For 
example, in King v. Andrus,153 the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia held that the right to jury trial applied to criminal 
proceedings in American Samoa.154  The court based its analysis solely 
on the practical difficulties of extending the right to jury trial,155 
eventually concluding that the jury system could be implemented in 
American Samoa without any significant logistical or administrative 
hindrances.156 
Accordingly, in deciding the four Insular Cases that deal with the 
right to jury trial, the Supreme Court based its decisions on practical 
concerns that were specific to each individual case, rather than 
focusing on the right to jury trial itself.  Additionally, many of the 
major issues justifying the Court’s decision not to extend the Jury 
Trial Clause in the Insular Cases are not present in Guantanamo.157  It 
would therefore be inaccurate to say that any of these specific cases 
preclude the Jury Trial Clause from applying in Guantanamo Bay.158 
                                                 
 152. E.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470–71 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that the petitioners, like all Guantanamo detainees, were captured 
abroad during the conflict between the United States and the Taliban). 
 153. 452 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1977). 
 154. See id. at 17 (holding that Samoan policies denying the right to jury were 
facially unconstitutional). 
 155. See id. at 12 (identifying the main question in the case as whether establishing 
a jury trial system in American Samoa would be impractical and anomalous).  The 
opinion was devoid of the Insular Cases’ buzzwords such as “fundamental,” 
“incorporated,” or any other language that would indicate a belief that the Insular 
Cases were controlling.  Id. 
 156. Id. at 16. 
 157. See supra notes 137–52 and accompanying text (discussing several of the 
Court’s reasons for declining to apply the Jury Trial Clause in the Insular Cases, 
including the significant disruptive effect that implementing the Jury Trial Clause 
would have had on the territories’ existing legal systems). 
 158. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
result) (“To take but one example:  Balzac v. Porto Rico is not good authority for the 
proposition that jury trials need never be provided for American citizens tried by the 
United States abroad; but the case is good authority for the proposition that there is 
no rigid rule that jury trial must always be provided in the trial of an American 
overseas, if the circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and 
anomalous.” (citation omitted)); Ragosta, supra note 9, at 297 (suggesting that the 
Bill of Rights was intentionally drafted in universal language and that the framers 
intended the rights conferred therein to apply regardless of citizenship). 
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2. Although none of the Insular Cases specifically are controlling, the 
 doctrine of territorial incorporation as expressed by the Insular Cases 
 collectively supports applying the Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo 
While the specific holdings of the Insular Cases are not themselves 
controlling, the collective doctrine for which the cases are cited—that 
is, the idea of territorial incorporation—is still applied to questions of 
extraterritoriality today.159  With that in mind, two questions follow.  
First, is Guantanamo Bay an incorporated territory where the 
Constitution applies in full?160  Second, if Guantanamo Bay is an 
unincorporated territory, is the right to jury trial considered 
fundamental such that it would apply regardless?161 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence lacks a clear answer as to 
whether Guantanamo Bay is considered an incorporated territory.162  
Given that Cuba still retains de jure sovereignty over the area, it is 
fairly clear that Guantanamo Bay will not achieve statehood in the 
near future,163 but the area is also very different from the territories 
deemed unincorporated in the Insular Cases.164  However, even 
assuming arguendo that Guantanamo is clearly an unincorporated 
territory, the fundamental nature of the Jury Trial Clause suggests 
that it would still attach under the Insular Cases doctrine. 
Indeed, there is overwhelming historical evidence supporting 
categorization of the right to jury trial as a fundamental right in the 
United States.  This much has been evident since the Constitution’s 
drafting, at which time the right to jury trial was referred to as “the 
very palladium of free government.”165  The Supreme Court spoke 
                                                 
 159. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 270–71 (2010) (discussing the role that the Insular Cases 
played in influencing Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene). 
 160. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (explaining that incorporated 
territories were treated similarly to states for purposes of constitutional analysis). 
 161. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (stating that only those rights 
deemed fundamental apply in unincorporated territories). 
 162. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (asserting that questions of 
sovereignty in Guantanamo could have implications for government action in all 
unincorporated U.S. territories).  The lower courts have assumed from this language 
that Guantanamo is unincorporated.  See, e.g., Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. 
Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 33 (D.P.R. 2008) (citing Boumediene for the proposition 
that Guantanamo is an unincorporated territory).  However, the Court in Boumediene 
did not expressly state Guantanamo’s status as a territory.  553 U.S. at 765. 
 163. See 1903 Lease Agreement, supra note 103, art. 3 (recognizing Cuba’s 
ultimate sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay). 
 164. See supra notes 132–52 and accompanying text (discussing the factual 
discrepancies between Guantanamo and the territories in the Insular Cases). 
 165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra 20, at 562; see also Alschuler & Deiss, supra 
note 21, at 871 (noting that the Framers enthusiastically supported the right to jury 
trial because of the large part it played in resisting the English before the 
Revolutionary War). 
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just as fervently about the right to jury trial in Ex parte Milligan when it 
wrote that the Jury Trial Clause could not be withheld from a non-
service member defendant in a criminal trial so long as “ideas can be 
expressed in words, and language has any meaning.”166  Further, the 
Court directly addressed the question of whether the right to jury 
trial is fundamental in Duncan v. Louisiana167 and answered—
emphatically—in the affirmative.168  Justice White stated: 
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions 
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be 
enforced and justice administered.  A right to jury trial is granted 
to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the 
Government.  Those who wrote our constitutions knew from 
history and experience that it was necessary to protect against 
unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and 
against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. . . .  
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers 
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge.169 
Justice White’s words, in combination with those of Justice Davis in 
Milligan and Alexander Hamilton’s in the Federalist Papers, leave 
very little room for an argument that the Jury Trial Clause is anything 
less than a fundamental right.  Because the right to jury trial is 
recognized as fundamental, the Jury Trial Clause applies to 
Guantanamo Bay even if it is an unincorporated territory.170 
3. Applying the Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo would not be 
 “impracticable and anomalous” 
In his concurring opinion in Reid, Justice Harlan stated that the 
threshold question in adjudicating questions of extraterritoriality 
based on the Insular Cases is whether extending a particular right 
                                                 
 166. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). 
 167. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 168. See id. at 149 (declaring that the right to jury trial is “fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice”). 
 169. Id. at 155–56 (footnote omitted). 
 170. The Ninth Circuit has held that Duncan’s incorporation of the Sixth 
Amendment against the states does not apply to U.S. territories.  See N. Mar. I. v. 
Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 689 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that Duncan does not prevent 
local territorial governments from establishing their own set of procedural rules).  
This reasoning, however, would not apply in Guantanamo, as the area is controlled 
by the U.S. military rather than by an independent local government.  See supra 
notes 141–43 and accompanying text (noting the absence of any cultural 
repercussions that could follow from implementing constitutional rights on a U.S. 
military base with no local population). 
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would be “altogether impracticable and anomalous.”171  This concept 
has since become an important one in determining the 
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution.172  In Boumediene, for 
example, Justice Kennedy discussed at length whether it would be 
impracticable and anomalous to extend the Suspension Clause to 
Guantanamo.173  After discussing several potential hindrances to the 
Clause’s application,174 Justice Kennedy concluded that there were no 
existing practical obstacles making it impracticable and anomalous to 
allow Guantanamo detainees the right to pursue habeas corpus.175  
Applying this particular part of Boumediene’s analytical framework to 
the Jury Trial Clause compels the same conclusion. 
Imposition of the American jury trial system at Guantanamo 
presents no risk of conflict with a local culture because Guantanamo 
has never actually been under Cuban control or inhabited by its 
population.176  Additionally, as the Cuban courts have no 
jurisdiction within Guantanamo, Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that 
there could be no potential friction with the Cuban government 
also applies with respect to application of the Jury Trial Clause.177  
Therefore, the only practical obstacle to applying the Jury Trial 
Clause in Guantanamo—at least as articulated in Boumediene—is the 
potential cost of its application.178 
                                                 
 171. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) 
(emphasizing the importance of a functional approach to determining constitutional 
extraterritoriality). 
 172. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (relying on Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Reid in arguing for a functional approach to 
extraterritoriality); see also Neuman, supra note 2, at 259 (observing that the 
functional approach that Justice Harlan employed in Reid is “the best fit, both 
descriptively and normatively, to the Court’s modern case law”). 
 173. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (stating that one of the main considerations in 
determining whether to extend the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo involved the 
practical obstacles inherent in its application). 
 174. See id. at 768–70 (listing cost, potential friction with the Cuban government, 
and interference with the local population as practical considerations specific to 
Guantanamo). 
 175. See id. at 771 (holding that the Suspension Clause “has full effect at 
Guantanamo”). 
 176. See Raustiala, supra note 100, at 2536 (noting that Guantanamo Bay “has 
remained in U.S. hands continuously since Cuba’s capture in the Spanish-American 
War”); see also supra notes 141–44 (arguing that the military base at Guantanamo Bay 
does not possess any “wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions” that could 
potentially be disrupted by the implementation of the Jury Trial Clause). 
 177. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770 (noting that while obligated to abide by the 
terms of its lease, the United States is not answerable to another sovereign for its 
actions on the base). 
 178. See id. at 769 (conceding that the cost associated with implementing 
constitutional rights in Guantanamo Bay should be taken into account as a potential 
inhibiting factor). 
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It is true that the cost of implementing the Jury Trial Clause in 
Guantanamo may be different than the costs considered in 
Boumediene, but the same basic principles still apply.  Significantly, 
while the Court in Boumediene acknowledged the sensitivity of cost in 
extending constitutional rights extraterritorially, it nevertheless 
concluded that such considerations should not be dispositive.179  In 
stating that “[c]ompliance with any judicial process requires some 
incremental expenditure of resources,” Justice Kennedy dismissed 
the idea that potential cost was enough to make implementation of 
the Suspension Clause impracticable and anomalous.180 
The same can be said of the costs associated with extending the 
Jury Trial Clause to Guantanamo.  While it is certainly a valid 
consideration, cost as an isolated issue is not significant enough a 
barrier that it should determine who is allowed access to 
fundamental constitutional rights.181  The Court in Boumediene made 
clear that cost-related concerns did not sufficiently show that the 
government’s military mission would be thwarted should it be 
required to grant detainees access to certain constitutional rights.182  
Given the relatively small number of cases affected by this issue,183 it 
is unlikely that the Court’s stance would change with reference to 
the Jury Trial Clause. 
One additional consideration that was not present in Boumediene is 
the composition of the jury veneer in the event that the Jury Trial 
Clause is extended to Guantanamo.  The base population at 
Guantanamo—estimated at roughly 5500184—is fairly small, but no 
other U.S. territory has been prevented from implementing jury trials 
based on population size.185  Given the limited number of possible 
                                                 
 179. Id. at 769. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text (describing the right to jury 
trial’s fundamental role in the American legal system). 
 182. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769 (suggesting that in order to be considered 
impracticable and anomalous, implementation of a right in Guantanamo would have 
to compromise the government’s military mission in the area). 
 183. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77–78 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
result) (positing that the practical problems associated with extending the right to 
jury trial are lessened when the caseload is fairly limited). 
 184. Welcome Aboard, CNIC:  NAVAL STATION GUANTANAMO BAY, http://www.cnic.navy.mil 
/guantanamo/About/Command/WelcomeAboard/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 185. The Northern Mariana Islands, for example, implement a jury trial system—
albeit one that is implemented statutorily rather than constitutionally—despite 
having a population of only 17,000 spread across three islands.  See N. Mar. I. v. 
Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 685 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing a local statute implementing a 
similar jury trial system to what is provided in the U.S. Constitution). 
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trials at issue,186 roughly a third of the base’s population would be 
called upon for each of Guantanamo’s 166 detainees to be given a 
jury of twelve.187  It is difficult to imagine how this could be construed 
as an “anomalous” endeavor. 
At present, there are no inherent practical obstacles that would 
make it “impracticable and anomalous” to apply the Jury Trial Clause 
in Guantanamo.  While there are several considerations to which the 
Court should remain sensitive, there is no indication that the 
government’s military mission at Guantanamo would be 
compromised if detainees were allowed the right to jury trial.188  
Therefore, withholding the right to jury trial from Guantanamo 
detainees would be inconsistent with the Court’s modern 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence. 
B. There is No Recognized Exception to the Jury Trial Clause That Would 
Categorically Exclude Guantanamo Detainees 
Aside from the Insular Cases, the only hindrance to the application 
of the Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo Bay is Quirin.189  The 
argument against jury trials in Guantanamo—as the government has 
articulated it to this point—has been that certain detainees should 
not be granted a jury trial because they are enemy combatants and 
have violated the law of war.190  While this rule may be functional in 
certain circumstances, it does not speak to the availability of the Jury 
Trial Clause for detainees who do not meet these requirements.  
Further, arguing against the application of the Jury Trial Clause 
based on the exception created in Quirin actually presupposes that 
                                                 
 186. See The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 106 (listing the total number of 
detainees currently in Guantanamo at 166). 
 187. It could be argued that a jury comprised mainly of members of the military 
community and their families may not be an “impartial jury” as is required by the 
Sixth Amendment.  However, such high profile cases are unlikely to garner a truly 
unbiased jury even if jurors were flown in from other parts of the country.  Cf. John 
C. Meringolo, The Media, the Jury, and the High-Profile Defendant:  A Defense Perspective on 
the Media Circus, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 981, 1004–12 (2011) (discussing the effect that 
media bias and alleged intimidation attempts had on the jurors in the trial of John 
Gotti, Jr.). 
 188. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S., 723, 769 (2008) (indicating that 
implementation of a constitutional right in Guantanamo would have to frustrate the 
government’s mission at the base in order to be considered impracticable and 
anomalous). 
 189. See Vladeck, supra note 45, at 322 n.152 (observing that the government’s 
original argument against the application of the Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo 
was based largely on Quirin). 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1184 (C.M.C.R. 
2011) (en banc) (quoting Quirin in making the determination that the appellant was 
appropriately tried by military commission without the benefit of a jury), vacated, No. 
11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013). 
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the detainees would be entitled to a jury trial if the exception is 
found not to apply.  If this was not the case, and the Jury Trial Clause 
simply did not apply to the defendants in Quirin, the exception 
created therein would have been unnecessary. 
1. Quirin does not categorically bar Guantanamo detainees from invoking 
 the Jury Trial Clause 
In Quirin, the Court held that the Jury Trial Clause is inapplicable 
to enemy combatants charged with violating the law of war.191  This 
decision has received a significant amount of criticism192 but has 
nonetheless been treated as precedent in the post-World War II era, 
including in Guantanamo Bay.193  Equally as important as the holding 
in Quirin, however, is the scope of the “law of war exception” that it 
created. 
The defendants in Quirin were non-citizens194 and were not lawfully 
present in the United States at the time of their trial.195  It is 
conceivable that the Court could have found these facts alone 
sufficient to bar the defendants from utilizing the protection of the 
Jury Trial Clause.196  Such a holding, in addition to being a significant 
departure from traditional thoughts on jury trial availability,197 would 
also have precluded the application of the Jury Trial Clause in many 
more circumstances.  However, the Court did not—and never has—
come to such a sweeping conclusion.198  Instead, the Court 
                                                 
 191. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 41 (1942). 
 192. See supra note 46 (acknowledging the dubious grounds on which Quirin was 
decided). 
 193. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (discussing Quirin’s 
application in Guantanamo as exemplified in Al Bahlul). 
 194. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20.  One of the defendants was a U.S. citizen at the time of 
the trial, but the Court found that his status as an enemy combatant placed him in 
the same grouping as the rest of the defendants.  Id. 
 195. See id. at 36 (noting that secretly entering an enemy country in civilian dress 
is “contrary to the law of war”). 
 196. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has recently issued a similar 
ruling, stating that non-citizen independent contractors cannot invoke Sixth 
Amendment protection without having a substantial connection to the United States.  
See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (holding that a non-citizen 
U.S. Army translator could not invoke Fifth and Sixth Amendment protection while 
on trial for an alleged assault committed in Iraq (citing United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990))).  For a critical examination of this argument, 
see Vladeck, supra note 10, which criticizes Ali as being profoundly flawed and based 
on dubious precedential support. 
 197. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) (asserting that the right 
to jury trial is available to anyone accused in a U.S. court that is not a member of the 
U.S. army, navy, or militia in actual service). 
 198. See Al Bahlul, Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 18–19 (stating that the Supreme 
Court has never categorically denied non-citizens unlawfully present in the United 
States the right to a trial by jury). 
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unanimously chose to rest its analysis on the much narrower ground 
that the defendants (1) were enemy combatants and (2) had been 
charged with violating the law of war.199 
There was no dispute as to whether the Quirin defendants met 
either of these requirements.  The defendants’ status as enemy 
combatants was uncontested as a result of a full confession given by 
one of the would-be saboteurs.200  Likewise, the offenses alleged 
against the defendants—including spying, moving through the 
United States in civilian dress, and relaying illegally obtained 
intelligence to enemy forces—were clearly established violations of 
the law of war.201  Because the defendants clearly met both elements 
of this test, the Court denied them the right to jury trial.202 
The narrowness of Quirin’s holding significantly affects its 
application in Guantanamo Bay.  If the Court in Quirin had 
broadened its holding to include all non-citizen defendants not 
lawfully present within the United States, it would logically follow that 
Guantanamo detainees were categorically unable to invoke the Jury 
Trial Clause.203  Conversely, applying Quirin’s law of war exception 
would produce far less consistent results due to the exception’s 
inherent limitations based on status of the offender and the nature of 
the alleged offense.204  Simply put, for Quirin to apply to a particular 
                                                 
 199. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41 (“An express exception from Article III, § 2, and 
from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, of trial of petty offenses and of criminal 
contempts has not been found necessary in order to preserve the traditional practice 
of trying those offenses without a jury.  It is no more so in order to continue the 
practice of trying, before military tribunals without a jury, offenses committed by 
enemy belligerents against the law of war.”). 
 200. See Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War:  The Meaning and 
Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 62 (1980) (explaining one of 
the saboteurs’ decision to give a full confession to the FBI upon concluding that 
their eventual discovery was inevitable). 
 201. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23.  The information obtained in the defecting 
defendant’s confession was sufficient to charge all eight defendants with violating 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Articles of War.  See id. (describing the charges against the 
defendants as specific violations of the law of war). 
 202. See id. at 40 (arguing that the jury trial provisions of the Constitution had 
never been understood to extend to trials for offenses against the law of war). 
 203. To date, there has been only one Guantanamo detainee with U.S. citizenship.  
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion) (describing the 
circumstances under which Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was briefly detained at 
Guantanamo Bay); see also The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 106 (listing the 
citizenship status of all current and former Guantanamo detainees).  However, the 
government transferred Hamdi to a military base in Norfolk, Virginia, upon realizing 
that he was a U.S. citizen.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion). 
 204. Defendants who are not designated enemy combatants or who have not been 
charged with violating the law of war cannot be prosecuted under Quirin.  See 
Vladeck, supra note 45, at 337–38 (arguing that Quirin’s application should be 
limited to cases in which the defendant falls neatly into both categories).  Given the 
lack of clarity regarding Guantanamo detainees’ status both as offenders and 
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detainee, two factors must be present:  the detainee must be an 
officially designated enemy combatant, and the detainee must have 
been charged with violating the law of war. 
However, the law of war exception does not apply to all 
Guantanamo detainees with the certainty that was present in Quirin.  
While it was perfectly clear that both requirements of the exception 
applied to each Quirin defendant, the same cannot be said about 
detainees in Guantanamo with respect to their status as offenders205 
or the offenses with which many of them have been charged.206  If 
one or both of these requirements is not met in a particular 
detainee’s case, the law of war exception cannot apply. 
United States v. Hamdan207 provides a particularly illuminating 
example of this point.  Salim Hamdan was originally charged with 
providing material support for terrorism208 and was convicted by the 
U.S. Court of Military Commission Review.209  The D.C. Circuit 
overturned his conviction, holding that material support is not a 
violation of the law of war and is therefore not triable by military 
commission.210  In addition to its obvious implications for other 
detainees charged with material support, the standard articulated in 
Hamdan for what constitutes a violation of the law of war could have a 
significant impact on detainees charged with other crimes as well.211  
This new rule, combined with the uncertainty surrounding several 
                                                 
whether the offenses actually constitute violations of the law of war, it is unlikely that 
Quirin would be found to control every detainee’s case.  Infra notes 205–06. 
 205. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008) (holding that the CSRTs, 
which were conducted by the government to determine Guantanamo detainees’ 
status as enemy combatants, did not pass constitutional muster).  Despite the 
inadequacy of the CSRTs, the process that they afforded detainees was far greater 
than what had previously been available to them.  See id. at 733 (noting that the 
CSRTs were created in response to Hamdi’s initial declaration that Guantanamo 
detainees were entitled to at least some constitutional protection). 
 206. See Vladeck, supra note 45, at 339 (acknowledging the lack of a uniform 
opinion as to whether the crimes of terrorism or providing material support for 
terrorism are violations of the law of war). 
 207. 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 208. Specifically, Hamdan was charged both with providing material support for 
carrying out an act of terrorism and for providing material support for a terrorist 
organization based on his alleged support to al Qaeda in Afghanistan by serving as 
Osama bin Laden’s driver.  See id. at 1244. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. at 1250–53 (holding that in the absence of international law support, 
the charge could not be classified as a war crime). 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1246 (C.M.C.R. 
2011) (en banc) (listing the charges against the defendant, including material 
support for terrorism, conspiracy to commit terrorism, and solicitation of other 
persons to commit terrorism), vacated, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013); see also 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 602 (2006) (plurality opinion) (asserting that it 
is inappropriate to recognize an offense as a violation of the law of war unless 
precedent supporting such a classification is “plain and unambiguous”). 
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other crimes with which detainees have been charged, lends 
significant support to the assertion that Quirin is not categorically 
applicable in Guantanamo Bay. 
The uncertainty surrounding Quirin’s application in Guantanamo 
is magnified when considered in light of Toth.  In Toth, the Court 
stated that the right to jury trial is so significant that any exception to 
it should be limited to “the least possible power adequate to the end 
proposed.”212  This rule signifies the Court’s belief that any 
curtailment of the right to jury trial must be limited to its narrowest 
possible interpretation in order to satisfy constitutional demands.213  
In the context of Guantanamo, this limitation means that detainees 
who are not clearly within Quirin’s scope are not subject to the law of 
war exception.214  Therefore, when there is any question regarding 
whether one or both of Quirin’s requirements is met in a given case, 
courts should lean towards finding that the defendant has a right to 
jury trial. 
The purpose of this distinction is not to argue against Quirin’s 
application in Guantanamo Bay.  Rather, this distinction serves to 
point out that Quirin’s application in Guantanamo cannot be 
considered a categorical rule.  The Supreme Court’s hesitance to 
limit the right to jury trial, considered in combination with 
Quirin’s already erratic applicability in Guantanamo, makes it 
nearly inevitable that Quirin will not be applicable to every 
Guantanamo detainee in every circumstance.215  If Quirin is found 
to be inapplicable, the previous discussion of the Jury Trial Clause 
as a fundamental right suggests that it should apply in 
Guantanamo Bay.216 
                                                 
 212. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)). 
 213. See id. at 23 n.22 (stating that the right to jury trial plays such a crucial role in 
our legal system that any attempt to limit or withhold it should be carefully 
scrutinized); see also Vladeck, supra note 45, at 337 (emphasizing the importance of a 
“lenity-based approach” to Quirin’s law of war exception). 
 214. See Vladeck, supra note 45, at 337–38 (arguing that Quirin should only be 
applied in situations where it is clear both that the defendant is an enemy combatant 
and that the defendant is charged with violating a clearly defined law of war). 
 215. See id. at 337 (contending that Quirin’s exception should be read narrowly 
when considered in light of the Toth Court’s emphasis on the importance of the jury 
as a fact-finder). 
 216. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text (identifying the right to 
jury trial as a fundamental right that attaches in both incorporated and 
unincorporated territories). 
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2. Applying Quirin in Guantanamo presupposes that the Jury Trial Clause 
 would otherwise be available to Guantanamo detainees 
In refusing to issue a more sweeping rule in Quirin, the Court 
hinted at its opinion of the Jury Trial Clause in general.  If the Court 
believed that the Jury Trial Clause was categorically inapplicable to 
non-citizens not lawfully present within the United States, then the 
law of war exception that made up the bulk of the Court’s argument 
in Quirin would have been unnecessary.217  It is therefore likely that 
the Court believed certain individuals who were similarly situated to 
the Quirin defendants, but who fell outside the scope of the law of 
war exception, would be entitled to a trial by jury. 
This presupposition is even more apparent in the context of 
Guantanamo Bay.  In Al Bahlul, for example, arguments against the 
application of the Jury Trial Clause in the defendant’s trial are based 
primarily on Quirin.218  The Court of Military Commission Review 
denied al Bahlul a jury trial because the court labeled him an enemy 
combatant who had violated the law of war.219  As in Quirin, the Al 
Bahlul court made no mention of whether the defendant would have 
been initially entitled to a jury before the law of war exception was 
found to apply.220  Even the government’s brief on appeal to the D.C. 
Circuit is devoid of any language suggesting that the Jury Trial Clause 
simply does not apply to Guantanamo detainees.221 
The government’s reliance on Quirin in Guantanamo Bay rests on 
the same assumption that was originally relied upon in Quirin itself; if 
the government believed that Guantanamo detainees were simply not 
entitled to the protection of the Jury Trial Clause as a matter of 
                                                 
 217. See Al Bahlul, Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that there would be 
no need for Quirin’s law of war exception if the defendants—non-citizens being 
detained outside the territorial United States—simply were categorically excluded 
from invoking the Jury Trial Clause). 
 218. See supra notes 122–27 and accompanying text (recounting the government’s 
reliance on Quirin in arguing against al Bahlul’s right to jury trial). 
 219. See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1183–84, 1188 (C.M.C.R. 
2011) (en banc) (concluding that al Bahlul was properly subjected to trial by military 
commission), vacated, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013). 
 220. See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29–48 (1942) (establishing the 
determination of a violation of a law of war as a precursor to evaluating the 
constitutional right to jury trial); Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1166–67 (applying 
Quirin’s threshold question of determining whether a defendant violated the law of 
war). 
 221. See generally Brief for the United States at 22–69, Al Bahlul v. United States, 
No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), 2012 WL 1743629, at *22–69 (outlining the 
government’s argument regarding whether trial by military commission—without the 
benefit of a jury—is constitutionally appropriate in al Bahlul’s case).  The 
government’s argument here is again based heavily on Quirin, referencing the case 
nineteen times but making no mention of a possible categorical bar on the Jury Trial 
Clause in Guantanamo.  Id. 
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course, the government would have presented this argument outright 
at some point.  The absence of any such argument made by either the 
court or the government suggests a belief that categorically barring 
the Jury Trial Clause’s application in Guantanamo would be 
inappropriate. 
C. As a Constitutional Provision that “Follows the Flag,” the Jury Trial 
Clause Extends to Guantanamo Based on the Government’s Action in the Area 
Modern thoughts on extraterritoriality suggest that certain 
constitutional provisions, particularly those in the Bill of Rights, 
should “follow the flag”—that is, that these rights should be applied 
wherever the government affirmatively acts without regard to 
geographical constraints.222  The language of the Jury Trial Clause 
suggests that it should follow this interpretation.  There is no 
indication that the Jury Trial Clause is intended to protect only U.S. 
citizens tried within the United States;223 rather, the right to jury trial 
as conferred by the Sixth Amendment is given to a group referred to 
as “the accused” in the context of “all criminal proceedings.”224  Given 
the Framers’ thoughts on the importance of the right to jury trial,225 it 
                                                 
 222. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“The United 
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its power and authority have no 
other source.  It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.  When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, 
the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to 
protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be 
in another land.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Ragosta, supra note 9, at 295 
(observing that “the [constitutional] principles that protect aliens domestically and 
citizens abroad generally apply to interactions abroad between the government and 
aliens”).  But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990) 
(refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment to a search of a non-citizen’s home in 
Mexico). 
 223. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (postulating that the Fourth 
Amendment’s reference to “the people” implies that the right is reserved for 
members of the “national community” of the United States).  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
specifically contrasts the language of the Fourth Amendment to that of the Sixth 
Amendment, which refers more broadly to the accused in criminal proceedings.  Id. 
at 265–66. 
 224. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Although the procedure followed by courts in 
Guantanamo may differ in some ways from traditional Article III courts, it can be 
assumed that trials intended to assess the merits of claims of terrorism would still be 
considered “criminal proceedings” for Sixth Amendment purposes.  See, e.g., Al 
Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (discussing certain conduct that is subject to 
individual criminal liability under the Military Commissions Act of 2006).  The 
Supreme Court has held that other provisions of the Sixth Amendment attach in 
Guantanamo, further suggesting that the cases can be considered criminal 
proceedings.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in Guantanamo). 
 225. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text (describing the Framers’ 
unanimous respect for the jury trial and its role in shaping the U.S. legal system). 
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can be assumed that the terms describing the scope of the Jury Trial 
Clause are intentionally broad.226 
This idea is supported by case law, which in large part has followed 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez.227  Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence stated that the constitutional calculus shifts 
in favor of the rights of the accused when the United States 
affirmatively commences criminal proceedings against a non-
citizen.228  The basic premise behind this reasoning is that certain 
constitutional rights exist primarily as defensive measures to protect 
individuals from a potentially abusive government.229  If these rights 
attach as a result of government action, it would make very little sense 
to allow the government to subsequently withhold them in certain 
circumstances depending on the identity or location of the 
accused.230 
While it is not necessary here to create an exhaustive list of the 
rights that meet this classification, the right to jury trial would 
undoubtedly be high on such a list.  The Jury Trial Clause is—and 
always has been—necessary to the underlying fairness of criminal 
proceedings in the U.S. legal system.231  The role of the jury in 
criminal proceedings has repeatedly been held “fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice”232 with little regard for whom is claiming 
the status of “the accused.”233  In fact, it has been held that Duncan’s 
                                                 
 226. See Ragosta, supra note 222, at 297 (asserting that the Bill of Rights was 
written in intentionally universal language to reflect the inalienability of the rights 
therein). 
 227. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that 
additional constitutional safeguards attach to non-citizens against whom the United 
States has affirmatively commenced criminal proceedings); see also Ibrahim v. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2012) (allowing a Malaysian 
citizen living in Malaysia to bring First and Fifth Amendment claims in a U.S. court 
challenging her placement on a no-fly list); United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 260 
(U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (holding that non-citizens tried before a U.S. court in Berlin 
were entitled to a jury under the Sixth Amendment); Bahar, supra note 93, at 315 
(noting that both the Second and Third Circuits have cited Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez as controlling). 
 228. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that a 
different set of constitutional standards apply to non-citizens against whom the U.S. 
government affirmatively acts “within its sphere of foreign operations”). 
 229. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (discussing the role of the 
jury as placing a check on an otherwise easily abused government power). 
 230. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) (“No doctrine, involving 
more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of 
[the Constitution’s] provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies 
of government.”). 
 231. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text (rehashing the right to jury 
trial’s consistent classification as fundamental throughout American history). 
 232. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149. 
 233. See, e.g., id. at 161–62 (granting a jury trial to a defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor offense); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1957) (plurality opinion) 
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classification of the Jury Trial Clause as “fundamental”234 has a direct 
effect on American courts overseas, even when the defendants are 
not U.S. citizens.235  The Court’s willingness to extend the right to 
jury trial in such a wide variety of circumstances signifies the same 
level of respect for the role of the jury in modern case law as was 
present during the Constitutional Convention.236 
The importance of the right to jury trial is especially evident in 
Guantanamo Bay.  The impartiality that a jury provides is 
especially necessary in Guantanamo proceedings, where it is 
often unclear whether some detainees are actually “enemy 
combatants” as the government claims.237  As prisoners facing 
potentially grave consequences if convicted, the presence of a 
neutral jury to determine the validity of the government’s 
allegations is imperative.238  Failure to implement this 
constitutional safeguard would perpetuate the current practice of 
allowing the military to be responsible both for capturing 
detainees and for subsequently making determinations as to their 
guilt.  Continuing this system would cut against the freedom from 
arbitrary government action that the Court has sought to 
preserve since its decision in Ex parte Milligan.239 
                                                 
(holding that the Jury Trial Clause attached in the trial of U.S. citizens on a military 
base outside the United States); United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 260 (U.S. Ct. 
Berlin 1979) (granting a jury trial to a group of non-citizens on trial in a U.S. court in 
Berlin). 
 234. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154. 
 235. See Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 252 (“The combined holdings of Reid and Duncan 
dictate that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, the rights accorded 
defendants tried in American courts abroad should not differ from those accorded 
defendants tried in American courts in the United States.”). 
 236. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting that the importance of the 
right to jury trial was one of the few points of agreement between the Federalists and 
the Anti-Federalists when the Constitution was drafted). 
 237. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (emphasizing the district court’s 
finding that the affidavit pursuant to which the defendant was detained fell “far 
short” of factually supporting his detention); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 513 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting that, according to the district court, the 
declaration pursuant to which the defendant was detained fell “far short” of factually 
supporting his detention and that, therefore, the defendant should be allowed to 
provide counter-evidence to respond to the claims raised by the declaration). 
 238. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (noting the 
government’s concession that the gravity of certain cases is such that they should be 
heard by a traditional court—including a jury—notwithstanding any potential 
difficulties that may be involved). 
 239. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126 (1866) (stating that a fair trial 
with the assistance of an impartial jury is “the only sure way of protecting the citizen 
against oppression and wrong”). 
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CONCLUSION 
There is currently no Supreme Court precedent supporting a 
categorical refusal to apply the Jury Trial Clause at the Guantanamo 
Bay detention center.  In fact, a review of the relevant case law 
suggests the opposite.  This Comment has demonstrated that a 
contemporary application of the Insular Cases weighs in favor of 
applying the Jury Trial Clause in Guantanamo, notwithstanding a few 
factual distinctions that may suggest otherwise.  Additionally, the 
Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin offers a helpful but incomplete 
understanding of the Jury Trial Clause’s categorical application in 
Guantanamo, and suggests that defendants should be entitled to the 
right to a jury when Quirin is found to be inapposite.  Further, as it 
has already been established that the fact-finding procedures in 
Guantanamo to this point have been substantially lacking,240 the role 
of the jury in providing an essential element of fairness in U.S. 
criminal proceedings and protecting defendants in U.S. courts from 
potential government abuse justifies extending the right to jury trial 
to detainees in Guantanamo Bay.241 
Despite speaking of the inappropriateness of a categorical bar on 
the Jury Trial Clause, this Comment is not meant to suggest that 
Guantanamo detainees should be categorically allowed to invoke the 
right to jury trial.  It is likely that, despite Quirin’s shortcomings, it will 
serve as precedent in a number of Guantanamo cases.  Rather, this 
Comment is meant to suggest that the right to invoke the Jury Trial 
Clause should serve as the constitutional norm in Guantanamo unless 
an exception to the Clause is found to apply.  Failure to apply the 
Jury Trial Clause in this context would be a deviation from the Sixth 
Amendment that our Constitution simply does not tolerate. 
                                                 
 240. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (noting the “considerable 
risk of error” associated with the CSRTs’ fact-finding procedures). 
 241. See id. at 800–01 (Souter, J., concurring) (observing several appellants’ 
detention for six years without trial as evidence of the government’s failure to resolve 
pending legal issues in Guantanamo in a timely manner).  Justice Souter’s concerns 
regarding timeliness are just as relevant today, as more than 75% of the current 
population of Guantanamo detainees have been held there since 2002.  See The 
Guantanamo Docket, supra note 106 (acknowledging that 133 of Guantanamo’s 166 
current detainees are in their eleventh year of detention). 
